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 Pathologising Difference, Governing Personality 
Gordon Tait, QUT 
 
Abstract 
Recent research has stressed the integral part played by teachers in both preliminary 
diagnosis and ongoing treatment of a range of conduct and personality disorders.  
Teachers are not only required to be aware of a variety of new categories of difference 
(Attention Deficit Disorder, Selective Mutism, Borderline Personality Disorder, 
Antisocial Personality Disorder, to name but a few), but are also now lauded for 
extending the role of education into new areas of social management.  This paper will 
take issue with this understanding on two counts: first, teachers have always sought to 
mould the personalities of students, and the pathologisation of specific forms of conduct 
is simply a new tactic within a very old and familiar strategy.  Second, schools do not 
simply discover disorders such as ADD as objective facts of nature.  Rather, they are part 
of the process through which such differences are created, and by which individuals can 
be more effectively governed.        
 
Introduction 
To say the least, teachers are acutely aware of difference.  Indeed, a number of writers 
have made the case that mass schooling was founded with the primary intention of 
identifying, organising and producing difference (Foucault, 1977; Jones & Williamson, 
1979; Kirk, 1993).  In addition, the management of difference has long provided a 
foundation for policy formulation, a set of boundaries for curriculum design, a rationale 
for pedagogic and disciplinary intervention, the central logic behind the distribution of 
educational outcomes, and—along with other touchstones, such as „equity‟ and 
„quality‟—a remarkably versatile pivot for educational discourse. 
 
These discourses have taken a number of familiar forms. First and foremost, educational 
psychology has provided the largest girders in a conceptual framework built around the 
humanist mantra that all pupils are individuals, each with individual needs, responses and 
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abilities. This understanding of the teaching process regards the individual as the 
foundational unit of analysis and primary point of departure.  Therefore, according to this 
logic, the fundamental task of educators is to variously accommodate, encourage and 
refine such differences so as to produce the whole and self-actualised individual.  
Problems with this account of individuality aside (Mauss, 1985; Hirst and Wooley, 1985), 
this analysis ultimately closes down debate over educational difference, since it regards 
its most important manifestations as inherent.                  
 
Given this logical cul-de-sac, arguably a more productive set of concerns over educational 
difference have focused on both the difference that social differences can make to 
education, and the concomitant difference that education can make socially.  Centring 
around the traditional triumvirate of class, race and gender, these debates have dominated 
education for thirty years.  Although the debates still rage, they are matched in their 
ferocity by a parallel set of arguments concerning the validity and authority of the entire 
critical project.  A growing chorus of writers contend that traditional critical theory in all 
its forms, not just as applied to education, has long since run aground on the shoals of 
post-modernity, holed on issues of reductionism, power and identity, to name but a few 
(Hunter, 1994; McWilliam, 1994; Ladwig, 1996).  Leaving this dispute for another time 
and place, this paper will focus instead upon a more recent set of concerns over the issue 
of difference in the classroom.   
 
The rise of the inclusive school—that is, institutions where special needs students are to 
be given full access to, and involvement in, the daily life of the classroom—has now 
placed the teacher at the centre of diagnosis and treatment of a plethora of learning and 
conduct disorders.  Teachers are now expected to be able to intervene upon a wide range 
of educational differences, differences which are no longer either below the threshold of 
intervention or simply part of the human condition, but instead are now objective 
pathologies to be identified, categorised and normalised.  As Tomlinson pointed out as 
early as 1982, this appears to be part of an ongoing and exponentially-increasing process.  
After all, within the realm of educational difference/handicap, there were only two 
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classifications prior to 1890 (idiot and imbecile). This had swelled to eight by 1913 
(including divisions such as moral imbecile, and mental defective) and on to twelve in 
1945 (with severely subnormal, maladjusted, and delicate). Currently, the list of such 
differences is enormous—in excess of three hundred (Whitefield, 1999)—each with its 
own treatment, prognosis and educational implications. It will be argued that this process 
has a number of significant implications, not just for the teaching profession, but also for 
how difference is to be conceptualised, and most importantly, for how the population as a 
whole is to be governed.   
 
The Therapeutic Classroom 
A number of recent writers on classroom practice have contended that the role of the 
contemporary teacher is undergoing a significant transformation (Brophy, 1996; Jones 
and Jones, 1996).  While they suggest that imperatives towards inclusive schools have 
increased range of personality, behavioural and school adjustment problems facing 
average teachers, they also argue that it is now possible—in collaboration with 
psychologists, special education teachers, social workers and other assorted specialists— 
to identify a far greater range of educational difficulties and differences, differences 
teachers must know how to deal with.   
 
The argument here is that contemporary teachers have a very different job to their 
predecessors.  They are no longer simply charged with the effective transmission of 
curricular information, while at the same time looking after the children and preparing 
them for later life.  Teachers are now to be regarded as de-facto therapists, and whereas 
once significant conduct or learning difficulties would be the trigger for either expulsion 
or removal to special schools, teachers now, with the guidance of experts, have been 
recruited into the ongoing management of „problem‟ students (Lane, 1990; Tyler, 1993).  
This management involves a number of elements: first, it requires a working knowledge 
of a lot of discipline areas, from pedagogy to psychology, from counselling to child 
welfare, and (increasingly) from paediatrics to pharmacology.  Second, it necessitates a 
constant process of keeping up with developments and „discoveries‟ within those 
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discipline areas.  It is not enough for teachers to know that certain forms of shyness have 
now been pathologised as Generalised Social Phobia (Turner et al, 1992), it also helps to 
be aware of some of its nosological subdivisions—such as Selective Mutism (Black and 
Uhde, 1996), or Avoidant Personality Disorder (Holt et al., 1992)—as well as how to 
recognise them, what to do with them, and how to organise your classroom practices 
accordingly.  Third, these developments and discoveries are normally manifest in terms of 
a burgeoning array of student differences, to the extent that education has become 
(curriculum transmission aside), the effective management of those differences.         
  
However, the implications for this new professional terrain extend far beyond the 
boundaries of the school, in that these differences constitute far more, in terms of their 
significance, than mere pedagogic pragmatics.  While the education system has had its 
focus sharpened in recent years as an instrument for the production of employable 
citizens (Gee, Hull & Lanshear, 1996), the school is now also widely regarded as one of 
the central sites for some of the most important aspects of ongoing social management.  
Children at-risk of anything from unemployability to criminality are now targeted while 
still at school (McCallum, 1993), and the central mechanism by which this future social 
programming occurs, is the production, identification, organisation, and treatment of 
difference.      
  
Once again, any number of differences could be examined here, but currently probably 
the highest profile, and most discussed, is Attention Deficit Disorder with Hyperactivity 
(ADHD) (Meadmore, 1998; Whitefield, 1999).  With symptoms of fidgeting, excitability, 
impulsivity, immaturity, and lack of self control, estimates of the school population vary 
widely, from three percent to ten percent, although classes with a much greater 
percentages with AHHD have been reported (Reif, 1993).  There exist numerous 
strategies for dealing with this new affliction (such as behaviour modification, 
counselling, cognitive therapy, social skills training), but pharmacological intervention 
through the use of the stimulant Ritalin is widely regarded as being the most significant. 
As with other pathologised differences, schools have been charged with the primary 
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responsibility of managing ADHD (almost all identification protocols, treatments and  
research literature are school-based).  Furthermore, the implications and effects of such 
(formerly) hyperactive conduct are no longer deemed to be confined either to the 
classroom, or to the schooling years.  There is now a significant literature which serves 
the dual purpose of laying the blame for a number of social problems at the door of 
ADHD (such as various forms of criminal conduct, delinquency, social maladjustment, 
emotional problems, professional failure, and so on) while at the same time reinforcing 
the need for identifying and tackling the problem in its embryonic stages at school 
(Forehand et al., 1991; Dunning, 1998).  
 
In summary then, it is generally argued that the teacher has now been placed as the 
primary locus of control in the preliminary diagnosis and ongoing treatment of a range of 
socially-disruptive disorders.  Schools are not only required to be aware of a variety of 
new categories of difference, but are also now lauded for extending the role of education 
into new areas of population management.  That is, the shaping of acceptable 
personalities and modes of conduct are now deemed to be within the governmental 
purview of the school.   
 
This paper will take issue with this understanding on two counts: first, schools have 
always sought to govern the behaviour of pupils, and the pathologisation of specific 
forms of conduct is simply a new tactic within a very old and familiar strategy.  Second, 
schools (via teachers, educational psychologists, and assorted other learning specialists) 
do not discover these personality disorders as objective facts of nature.  Rather, they are 
part of the process through which such differences are created, and by which individuals 
can be more effectively governed.  Taking these in turn: 
 
Old Strategies, New Tactics 
The argument outlined earlier—that contemporary teaching has expanded to encompass 
the overt management of personality (through the relay of any number of identifiable and 
discreet mental disorders), an argument which animates a good deal of the rhetoric over 
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the role, responsibilities and future of the modern school—does not stand up to close 
scrutiny.  A number of texts, but in particular the work of Ian Hunter, have recently 
sought to reinterpret the origins of mass schooling, thereby problematising some of the 
most common misconceptions around its formation and function (Meredyth and Tyler, 
1993; Hunter, 1988; 1994).  One of Hunter‟s most significant contentions is to reject the 
totalising discourses that schools are either unsuccessful attempts at equity, or equally 
failed attempts at complete personal development.  Rather, two aspects of the improvised 
and ad-hoc school are foregrounded, that is: „its relation to the apparatus of the 
administrative or governmental state, and its relation to the institutions of Christian 
pastoral guidance‟ (Hunter, 1994: xviii).  Within this overarching logic, Hunter contends 
that mass schooling became one of the most important and convenient mechanisms for 
implementing specific forms of self-cultivation and distributing them to a mass 
population.  That is, the appearance of the modern classroom had the dual effect of 
regulating the behaviour and bodily demeanour of large numbers of children while 
simultaneously supplying them with the various skills and capacities related to 
appropriate self-regulation (Hunter, 1984). 
 
This sounds rather familiar.  Indeed, close scrutiny of the role played by the various 
contemporary pathologisations of conduct reveal an identical set of aspirations.  Certainly 
the advent of the classroom made it possible to regulate demeanour as well as supply the 
capacities required for self-regulation, but so too does the differentiation concomitant 
with allocating the status of „ADHD pupil‟.  In doing so, the child is subject to a range of 
interventions, therapies and pedagogies which seek to normalise conduct and encourage 
better self-regulation—precisely the intention behind the introduction of the modern 
classroom.           
 
This shift in tactics, while retaining a similar strategy, is a point Hunter (1993) made with 
regards to the beginnings of child-centred pedagogy.  He argued that the ends of fostering 
specific forms of self-cultivation within a mass population could not be realised solely 
through the mechanisms available at the beginning of the nineteenth century—that is, 
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either through the strict regimen of monitorialism or the pastoral care of the Sunday 
school.  Hunter cites David Stow (1850), a nineteenth-century educational reformer, who 
argued for a form of schooling that allowed a greater level of freedom than previously 
possible within the monitorial school, and yet which still permitted the subtle imposition 
of required social norms.  This child-centred pedagogy successfully combined the 
strategies of pastoral care with those of social investigation and administration, and it also 
promoted a sympathetic relationship between teacher and pupil, in the form of the 
concerned teacher who observes and directs the moral development of children. Even in 
those educational sites generally characterised by their child-centredness, such as the 
kindergarten, pastoral care is combined with social investigation and management.  Thus, 
these two positions do not represent a fundamental opposition; rather they are two tactics 
that form part of a wider strategy aimed at the correct training of young people.  
 
And so it can be seen that schools have always sought to produce certain types of people, 
and to promote particular types of conduct.  Indeed, moral management has been one of 
the twin raison-d’etres of mass schooling since its inception, and this is still the case with 
the ongoing pathologisation of student conduct and personality—once again, a new tactic 
within an old strategy.  The scientisation of student difference has now opened the field 
up to a vast new range of interventions, which has in turn increased exponentially the 
effectiveness of the grid of governmental intelligibility aimed at young people.  As 
Meadmore (1998: 1) points out: 
 
Instances where a child is disruptive or where they are not learning 
successfully demand attention from the „experts‟ who range from medical 
practitioners, psychiatrists, psychologists, resource teachers and class 
teachers to the children‟s parents … Expert treatment is „successful‟ if 
some kind of reason can be found for the child‟s poor behaviour or 
learning problems and a therapeutic drug regimen put in place. 
 
The rise of this tactic—the use of medical and psychological categories for effective 
individuation—should not really come as any great surprise.  In The Birth of the Clinic, 
Foucault (1973) charts the rise of a new form of medicine, based upon observation and 
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the compilation of norms, which, via statistical analysis not only enabled the construction 
of life-histories for each complaint (and hence new and more comprehensive nosologies), 
but were also responsible, in part, for the emergence of the pivotal notion of „the case‟.  
Likewise, with psychology.  The concern for the health of the population did not stop 
with simply policing external manifestations of abnormality within the urban population, 
such as illness or deformity.  As Rose (1985;1990) contends, the health of the mind was 
now to be subject to governmental intervention and regulation.  The rise of the psy-
disciplines (psychology, psychiatry, psychoanalysis) denotes the emergence of a new 
rationale of government targeting human individuality.  The conduct of citizens was now 
to be directed by investigating, cataloguing, interpreting and modifying their mental 
capacities and predispositions:   
 
One fruitful way of thinking about the mode of functioning of the 
psychological sciences ... might therefore be to understand them as 
techniques for the disciplining of human difference: individualising 
humans through classifying them, calibrating their capacities and 
conducts, inscribing and recording their attributes and deficiencies, 
managing and utilising their individuality and variability. (Rose, 
1988:187) 
 
Just as the physically ill became sub-divided into more precise and workable categories, 
so too were the mental faculties of the population, beginning with the young.  A concern 
over the notion of the „feeble-minded‟, combined with the new-found psychometric 
techniques of mental measurement, resulted in the burgeoning of the taxonomies which 
set out the problems of the mind.  This process has been particularly evident within the 
school, and is now one of its most significant characteristics.  Contemporary pupils are no 
longer simply too lively, they are reclassified first as hyperactive, and now as suffering 
from Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) or Oppositional Defiance Disorder (ODD), or 
Conduct Disorder (CD).  Pupils are no longer simply quiet or shy, they are reclassified as 
suffering from Generalised Social Phobia, or Selective Mutism, or Avoidant Personality 
Disorder.  Pupils are no longer simply unpopular or obnoxious, they are reclassified as 
Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD), or Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD).    
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Through tactics such as these, the school (along with the pedagogic family) is now the 
central site where personality is to be shaped and normalised.  Furthermore, identifying, 
organising and treating non-conforming children as ADHD and ODD sufferers serves a 
dual purpose: first, there are significant administrative benefits from ongoing 
intervention, in the form of better and easier management, both in the home and the 
classroom.  Second, there is a greater social acceptability for a child to be suffering from 
a medical condition, that there is for one who might otherwise be regarded as willfully 
naughty.  As Meadmore (1998:1) states‟ It is better for everyone for the child to be “sick” 
rather than “bad”‟.  Given such pressures to pathologise those many students now 
produced as different, the question must eventually be asked about the veracity of the 
burgeoning array of medical and psychological categories such children are being placed 
into. 
 
Objective Disorders and Governance  
In the introduction to The Problem of Medical Knowledge, Wright and Treacher (1982) 
address some of the traditional assumptions that not only legitimate the pre-eminent 
status of medical science, but also act to support the validity of its truth claims.  Most 
frequently, such knowledge is presented as objective, benevolent and teleological, in that 
it slowly uncovers the facts of the natural world, with the individual researchers merely 
perceptive but neutral observers to whom these truths are passed.  In contrast, superseded 
ways of understanding and healing are presented as superstitious, ignorant and/or 
barbaric.  Thus, medical history is presented in triumphalist terms: the heroic unmasking 
of the hidden realities of nature, the shedding of light into the mysteries of the human  
body, and the identification and control of independent disease entities (Wright and 
Treacher, 1982:3-4).  However: 
 
Medical categories, we would contend, are social through and through; 
they are the outcome of a web of social practices and bear their imprint.  
When we speak of tuberculosis we are not reading the label on a discrete 
portion of nature, „out there‟; we are instead ... employing a social 
meaning that has been generated by the activities of many different social 
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groups, with diverse interests, working through many different forms of 
practice. (Wright and Treacher, 1982:10) 
 
There has long been dissatisfaction with elements of the labelling processes associated 
with „mental illness‟.  Seminal work by Hollingshead and Redlich (1958) noted that an 
individual‟s chance of being committed to a mental institution varied in relation to their 
social class - a variable surely irrelevant to an „objective‟ illness.  Likewise Szasz (1961; 
1973) proposes a radical shift in the understanding of „insanity‟ due, in part, to his refusal 
to accept the objective validity of the category.   More convincingly, in Madness and 
Civilisation, Foucault (1965) details some of the social contingencies which were 
necessary precursors to the emergence of psychiatry as a discipline—all of which go some 
way towards attenuating the „objective truth‟ of insanity.  Following on from this, a 
number of specific mental illnesses, claiming the status of „objective facts‟, have had this 
status challenged, such as split personality (Hacking, 1986), and anorexia nervosa (Tait, 
1993). And it is not in just what appears to be the more intangible regions of „mental‟ 
illness that the self-evidency of disease entities has been challenged.  As Wright and 
Treacher observed with tuberculosis, „obvious‟ physical diseases such as „syphilis‟ and 
„asthma‟ do not come with labels in nature, and hence have also been problematised 
(Fleck, 1979; Gabbay, 1982).  The question which arises now is how then does a disease 
entity such as Attention Deficit Disorder fare under this kind of scrutiny?  The following 
quote is typical of the way in which ADD is presented within the literature, and by those 
with an interest in its acceptance as a valid and objective category.  
 
ADD is an inherited neurobiological disorder which becomes evident in 
early childhood and usually continues throughout a person‟s life …There 
is no doubt in the scientific community that ADD is real … ADD is not a 
new phenomenon, it has always been with us but has not always been 
recognised. (D. and M. Sosin, 1996: p. 6-7) 
  
It is evident here that ADD is understood as an objective condition, an indisputable fact 
of nature.  In addition, it is deemed to have existed long before its identification by the 
clear-eyed and perceptive scientists who brought it to our attention, thereby dispelling the 
former—erroneous—explanations for the same conduct.  However, as previously 
discussed, this new set of explanations has a range of advantages over its predecessors, 
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advantages which have nothing to do with the objective truth, or otherwise, of the 
condition.  Rather, those differences are to do with the effective management of specific 
populations, and in many ways, exemplify the way in which government now occurs.  As 
Foucault (1991) points out, until the early eighteenth century, government had, in a sense, 
been its own purpose, operating almost exclusively in the interests of the sovereign.  
However, from this time onwards, the focus began to fall upon the welfare of the 
population instead, both directly and indirectly, not only in improving its conditions, but 
eventually also managing its habits, aspirations and interests.  Within this logic, 
government could best now be understood as, in Gordon‟s (1991:2) words, „the conduct 
of conduct‟.  This, in combination with the advent of liberalism (which took as its central 
problem the demarcation of the governable from the ungovernable, of those areas of 
necessary autonomy from necessary state intervention) gave rise to the conditions of 
possibility for the school-based pathologisation of difference characteristic of 
contemporary education.  That is, those domains where direct governmental intervention 
is deemed inappropriate—primarily the family, but also the school—more subtle forms of 
governmental management were required, those that operate „at a distance‟ through the 
medium of expertise.  It is the expertise associated with disciplines such as medicine, 
psychology, family guidance, welfare, counselling, and pedagogy which allow these 
domains a degree of autonomy, while simultaneously being the most important sites for 
instilling the capacities required of the population.  Importantly, teachers have now been 
recruited as quasi-experts within this new governmental apparatus. 
 
However, most significant of all, is the role that difference plays in government, a role 
Foucault discusses at length in Discipline and Punish (1977).  He notes that by placing 
individuals within the disciplinary space and time characteristic of mass schooling, 
observable differences could then appear.  At the same time, these disciplinary 
arrangements have permitted the production of an almost endless number of norms and 
their application to given populations.  One of the outcomes of this is the sorting and 
classifying of different categories of person, as part of the combined processes of 
normalisation/individuation.  Of course, these categories of person now include such 
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modern creations as the ADHD pupil, the ODD pupil, and the selective mute.   The more 
categories available, the more rigorous the web of governmental intelligibility.  And so, 
given its scientific legitimacy, its flexibility, and the density of its application, it seems 
plausible to argue that the tactic of pathologisation represents the latest and most effective 
word in a form of government based primarily upon the management of difference. 
 
Conclusion 
Two points are of note here.  First, the intention here has not been to reject education‟s 
role in social management.  As discussed, schools have always been given responsibility 
for the production of certain types of citizen.  Unless the position is adopted that pupils 
should be allowed free rein to develop into whatever they wish—following familiar 
liberal humanist, and essentialist, discourses on the development of the „whole person‟, 
and the reaching of a „full potential‟—then it is perfectly appropriate that the institutions 
of mass education play their part in shaping the population according to perceived 
requirements.  
 
Second, the issue here has not been to reject the various new medical/educational 
categories of difference outright.  The point is that when new cannons of judgement are 
employed, new realities come into being, and teachers are now confronted with a range of 
such new realities.  Refusing to accept the existence of ADHD then is, ultimately, of little 
use.  The decision as to its veracity will be made in locations other than the school, and 
by knowledges other than those produced by educators.  And it is not just new canons of 
judgement which produce new realities, so to do new forms of social administration.  
After all, it is not just medicine and psychology which produced ADHD, it was also the 
individuating/ differentiating logic of the contemporary school itself.     
 
That said, there is still perhaps a place for some healthy scepticism over the seemingly 
endless production of new categories of difference.  As previously mentioned, it is part of 
the ongoing processes of government to keep finding new „objective‟ classifications 
within which to normalise targeted sections of the population.  Surely then, it is 
appropriate not to accept immediately, dutifully and uncritically every new personality 
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and learning disorder that emerges.  Perhaps longevity should be regarded as the primary 
test of veracity.  Dyslexia has survived as a disease entity for in excess of thirty years, and 
still appears to operate well and validly within its definitional criteria, whereas the jury is 
still out on ADHD, and is likely to be so for some considerable time yet (McConnell, 
1997).  However, questions are still to be asked over entities like ADHD because of the 
social and administrative function they appear to serve within the classroom.  That is, 
suspicions inevitably arise over the objectivity of such disorders when their central 
purpose appears to be the maintenance of good order within a context as artificial and 
historically contingent as the panoptic classrooms of contemporary mass schooling.  
There is also the question of culturally/nationally differentiated diagnosis of such 
disorders (Reid, 1994; Smelter, 1996).  Children in the UK appear not to suffer from 
ADHD, whereas American children currently suffer from it in almost plague proportions.  
Likewise, it appears to be a disorder far more frequently diagnosed in boys (Nadeau, 
Littman & Quinn, 1999).         
 
In conclusion then, the intention here has been to reconfigure some of the ways in which 
difference can, and ought, to be discussed within education.  While anxieties over class, 
race and gender undoubtedly still have their place, it is the vocabularies of 
pathologisation which now constitute the most significant elements of the 
education/difference nexus.  Arguably, there are reasons to be concerned over this, and 
probably the leading cause for concern centres around the dominant mode of treatment 
for these pathologies.  All the disorders mentioned in this paper—ADHD, Oppositional 
Defiance Disorder, Generalised Social Phobia, Selective Mutism, Avoidant Personality 
Disorder, Borderline Personality Disorder, to name but a very few—are treated 
pharmacologically.  Or, to put it another way, disruptive students, quiet students, or 
generally different students, are drugged into normalcy. Given that the knowledges, 
discourses and contexts which construct these truths are inaccessible to the average 
teacher or educational commentator, then the only two choices remain: either become 
significantly more organised in voicing concern over the implications of these 
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developments than is currently the case, or accept that this form of differentiation and 
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